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Kaufman: Employment Discrimination

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker is going to deal with a question of
discrimination. I think most of us know that Professor Kaufinan is
one of the most prominent members of the Touro faculty, an author
on constitutional law, and a very important member of a committee
that draws up model jury charges for all of the judges in the state.
She rewrote the defamation section of those pattern jury charges.
She has been creating, within that book of jury charges, a whole
series of charges and comments dealing with discrimination, so she
is a very apt person to deal with the discrimination cases and some
other matters of interest to us. There was one case dealing with
sexual harassment. It is my pleasure to introduce Professor Eileen
Kaufman.
ProfessorEileen Kaufinan*:

INTRODUCTION

I am grateful that the topic assigned to me today is employment
discrimination, particularly sexual harassment, because hopefully
the topic is sufficiently interesting and controversial that I will be
able to keep your attention despite the lateness of the hour.
Let me begin by describing what I will not be covering, in the
interest of time. One of the cases that is included in the booklet is
National Organizationfor Women v. Scheidler,1 which is a RICO

* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A.,
Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975; LL.M., New York
University, 1992.

1. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
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case,2 not an employment discrimination case. Scheidler raises the
3
issue of whether RICO imposes an economic motive requirement.
This was the case involving the application of RICO to protesters
at abortion clinics. The only issue decided by the Court was that
RICO does not impose an economic motive requirement. 4 Left
unaddressed and unresolved are the interesting First Amendment
issues. 5 You may remember that this morning Professor Margulies
referred to Justice Souter as the "stealth" First Amendment
Justice. 6 That characterization is borne out in this RICO case
because Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize
that the decision in this case does not bar any subsequent First
Amendment challenges to the application of RICO to abortion
protesters. 7 He ends his opinion by noting, "I think it prudent to
notice that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy and to
caution courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First
Amendment interests that could be at stake." 8 We should therefore
be on the lookout for First Amendment challenges. We already
have seen quite a number of them, not only under RICO, but under
a statute that was adopted last spring, entitled FACE, The Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994.9 To my knowledge, the
courts have uniformly rejected First Amendment challenges to the
10
statute.
2. A RICO case involves a claim alleging that the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984), has been violated.
3. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 803.
4. Id.at 806.
5. Id. at 806 n.6 (explaining that the First Amendment issues were not
preserved for review).
6. Martin B. Margulies, FreeSpeech: The Status of the First Amendment,
11 TOURO L. REV. 341, 356 (1995).
7. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806 (Souter, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
10. See U.S. v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 870 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that
FACE is not unconstitutional); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 709 (D. Ariz.
1994) (holding that FACE does not violate the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, or
Tenth Amendments); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1101 (W.D. La. 1994)
(holding that FACE is a valid exercise of legislative power); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp 1422, 1431-32 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
FACE does not "infringe plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fifth
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Let me now outline what I do plan to cover this afternoon and
that is the employment discrimination cases of last Term: one
dealing with sexual harassment 1 1 and a pair of cases raising the
issue of the retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 12 Time
permitting, I will also talk a little about the major employment
13
discrimination case before the Court this year.
At the outset, we probably can agree that, starting with the
Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings, there has certainly been
renewed attention paid to employment discrimination statutes and
particularly to the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace.
According to one recent survey, companies have reported a
doubling of complaints of sexual harassment between the years
1991 and 1993.14
There are two types of sexual harassment. One is quid pro quo
harassment and the other is termed hostile work environment.
These two theories and terms were originally developed and coined
by Catharine MacKinnon, 15 and subsequently explicitly adopted
by the United States Supreme Court. 16 The two theories are quite
distinct. 17 A quid pro quo claim arises where there has been a
Amendments, or their putative statutory rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, and Congress had full authority to enact FACE under the
Commerce Clause"); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137
(E.D. Va. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of FACE).
11. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
12. Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
13. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir.
1993), rev'd and remanded, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23,
1995).
14. More Sexual Harassment Complaints, 1 N.Y. EMPLOYMENT L. REP. 2
(1994).
15. CATHARINE

A.

MACKINNON,

SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING

WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).

16. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
17. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding that it could not be accepted that the "'severity or pervasiveness'
element essential to an actionable hostile environment discrimination claim is
met merely with evidence sufficient to establish quid pro quo harassment");
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(stating that the sexual harassment only consisted of hostile work environment
because the defendant did not "demand sexual favors as a quid pro quo for job
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demand for sexual favors in exchange for some employment
benefit. In the language of the EEOC guidelines, quid pro quo
harassment occurs when "submission to or rejection of'
unwelcomed sexual "conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting such individual." 18 Hostile
work environment claims arise where there has been a "sufficiently
severe or pervasive [hostile environment] 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment [thereby] creat[ing] an abusive working
environment."' 19
I. HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS
There are two recent decisions that are very instructive regarding
how to analyze sexual harassment cases. 2 0 It seems to me that the
common denominator emerging from these cases is that when
analyzing sexual harassment claims, the focus should be on the
employer's conduct rather than on the employee's reaction.
The first case is Harrisv. Forklift Systems.2 1 This was only the
second sexual harassment case to reach the United States Supreme
23
Court.22 Harris worked as a manager for Forklift Systems.
Throughout her time there, her employer, the company president,
"often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the
target of unwanted sexual innuendoes."'24 Several times in the
presence of other employees, he said, "You're a woman, what do
benefits"); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 649 (6th
Cir. 1986) (noting that "unlike quid pro quo sexual harassment claims which
may be predicated upon a single incident of sexual harassment, hostile
environment claims are characterized by varied combinations and frequencies of
hostile sexual exposures" (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986))).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(2) (1994).
19. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted).
20. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993); Karibian v.
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
21. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
22. The first sexual harassment case to reach the United States Supreme
Court was Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. Harris,114 S. Ct. at 369.
24. Id.
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you know?" and "We need a man as the rental manager." 25 At
least once he called her "a dumb ass woman." 26 Again, in front of
others, he suggested that the two of them go to some nearby motel
in order to negotiate her raise. 27 He occasionally asked the plaintiff
and some "other female employees to get coins from his front
pants pocket" and often he would throw objects on the ground and
then ask the female employees to bend down to pick them up. 28 He
also made sexual innuendoes about her clothing.29 Finally, when
she was arranging a deal with one of the company's customers, he
asked her, in the presence of other employees, "What did you do,
promise the guy... some sex Saturday night? ' 30 Those were the
facts before the Court in Harris.
The Harrisdecision is very important for at least two reasons.
Firstly, the Court explicitly reaffirmed its holding in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,3 1 that sexual harassment constituting
unlawful employment discrimination is not limited to tangible
economic discrimination but also includes requiring people to
work in a discriminatory hostile or abusive environment. 32 In the
Court's words, "[w]hen the work place is permeated with
'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,'
Title VII is violated." 33 Secondly, and more specifically, the case
is important because it establishes that a plaintiff alleging a hostile
34 In
work environment need not prove psychological injury.
Harris,the employer argued that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate
psychological injury and that therefore, her case should be
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
32. Id. at 66. The Court agreed with the EEOC guidelines that a Title VII
violation may be established by "proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment." Id.
33. Harris,114 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).
34. Id. at 370-71.
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dismissed. 35 The Court rejected that argument and instead
announced the following standard: 36 "So long as the environment
would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or
abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically
injurious."' 37 I trust that you can hear the objective and subjective
elements of that test; objective in that the hostile work environment
must be one that would reasonably be perceived as such, but
subjective in that the employee must herself perceive it to be so.
The Court concedes that this is hardly a "mathematically precise"
test,3 8 a point also noted in Justice Scalia's concurrence where he
compares it to the standard for negligence which we have managed
39
to live with for quite some time.
In order to determine whether an environment is hostile for
purposes of Title VII, we look at the totality of circumstances,
including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity,
"whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance," and finally, whether the
employee's psychological well-being is affected. 4 0 The Harris
Court cautions that no one factor is required. Rather, these are
factors that should be taken into account in determining overall
whether the environment is sufficiently hostile so as to be
41
actionable.
It seems to me that this decision underscores the point that I
made earlier, that the focus of the inquiry in a sexual harassment
case should be on the defendant's conduct rather than on the
employee's reaction. As the HarrisCourt noted, "Title VII comes
into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous
breakdown." 42 Further, the Court explained that a hostile work
environment, even one that does not produce psychological injury,
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 371.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id. at 370.
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usually has other effects. 43 It often affects job performance, it
might prevent advancement in the job, it might "discourage
employees from remaining on the job," and needless to say, it
"offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality."-44
Therefore, the mere fact that the employee did not suffer
psychological injury does not defeat the claim.
II. KARIBIAN V. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
The other sexual harassment case which is quite instructive,
Karibian v. Columbia University,4 5 was decided by the Second
Circuit in 1994. This decision contains two very important
holdings, one dealing with quid pro quo claims and the other
dealing with employer liability for hostile work environment
claims. In Karibian, the employee gave in to her supervisor's
demand for sexual favors and thus received the promised economic
benefits. 4 6 For that reason, her claim was dismissed by the district
court because she could not prove any economic loss. 4 7 The
Second Circuit reversed, noting the obvious, that in the nature of
things, "evidence of economic harm will never be available to
support the claim of an employee who submits to the supervisor's
demands."'4 8 However, the absence of economic harm does not
render the conduct of the supervisor any less unlawful. 49 The
Second Circuit noted that "[u]nder the district court's rationale
only the employee who successfully resisted the threat of sexual
blackmail could state a quid pro quo claim." 50 The court further
stated that, "[s]uch a rule would only encourage harassers to
increase their persistence." 5 1 Under the Second Circuit's decision,
the relevant inquiry in a quid pro quo case is not whether the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 370-7 1.
Id. at 371.
14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1995], Art. 11

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol 11

employee suffered economic loss, but rather, whether the
supervisor "linked tangible job benefits to the acceptance or
rejection of sexual advances." 52 It is sufficient "to show that the
supervisor used the employee's acceptance or rejection of his
advances as the basis for a decision affecting the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of the employee's job."' 53 In
Karibian, as in Harris,the explicit focus of the court's analysis is
on the prohibited conduct, not on the victim's reaction.
The second issue decided in Karibian has to do with employer
liability for a hostile work environment. 54 By way of background,
it is clear that employers are vicariously or strictly liable for quid
pro quo harassment. 55 This rule reflects the fact that the harasser,
by definition, is wielding the employer's authority "to alter the
terms and conditions of employment."' 56 However, the question of
employer liability in hostile work environment cases has not been
decided by the Supreme Court. 57 In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,58 the Court left the question open but indicated that
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.at 779.

55. Id. (stating that "liability for quidpro quo harassment is always imputed
to the employee.. ."). See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)
(noting that agency principles would provide sound guidance in sexual
harassment cases); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding that "[u]nder a quidpro quo theory of sexual harassment, an
employee is held strictly liable for the conduct of its supervisory
employees.., under a theory of respondeat superior"); Carrero v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that "in a quidpro
quo sexual harassment case the employer is held strictly liable for its
employee's unlawful acts"); Steele v. Off Shore Shipbuilding Inc., 867 F.2d
1311, 1316 (1lth Cir. 1989) (holding that "the corporate defendant is strictly
liable for the supervisor's harassment"); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915
F.2d 777, 785 (1st Cir. 1970) (reiterating that "'an employer is strictly liable for
the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual discrimination or sexual
harassment resulting in tangible job detriment to the subordinate
employee'(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (lth Cir.
1982))).
56. Karibian,14 F.3d at 777.

57. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-72 (declining to establish "a definite rule on
employer liability...").
58. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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employers are not automatically strictly liable for hostile work
environment created by their employees but on the other hand, are
not automatically insulated from liability by either a lack of notice
to the employer or the existence of complaint procedures. 5 9 In
Karibian,the Second Circuit struck something of a middle ground
between those two extremes. The Second Circuit held that an
employer is liable for a hostile work environment "created by a
supervisor if the supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to
further the harassment or if he was otherwise aided in
accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency
relationship. ' 60 When, however, the hostile environment is created
by a fellow employee or by a low-level supervisor who is not using
any actual or apparent authority to carry out the harassment, then
the employer will not be liable for the hostile work environment
unless the employer either provided no reasonable means for
grievance or complaints or if the employer was aware of the
harassment and did nothing about it.61
Three days after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Karibian,the Third Circuit rendered a decision that seems to take a
slightly different approach on the issue of employer liability in a
hostile work environment case. 62 I think it is only a matter of time
until the Supreme Court resolves the question of employer liability
for hostile work environments created by supervisors.
Ill. LANDGRAF V. USI FILM PRODUCTS & RIVERS V.
ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.
The other major employment discrimination cases decided last
year have to do with the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 63 the Act that
59. Id. at 72.
60. Karibian,14 F.3d at 780.
61. Id.
62. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "'if
a plaintiff proves that management-level employees had actual or constructive
knowledge about the existence of a sexually hostile environment and failed to
take prompt and adequate remedial action, the employer will be liable"' (citing
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983))).
63. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 107 1.
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changed many aspects of Title VII and other employment
discrimination statutes. The issue resolved in Landgrafv. USI Film
Products6 4 and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc, 6 5 is whether the

Act is retroactive, that is whether it applies to cases pending when
the Act was enacted. I am sure you recall the somewhat tortured
history leading up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.66
Basically, this Act was proposed and ultimately enacted to
legislatively overrule a series of Supreme Court decisions
announced in 1989, most notably Wards Cove v. Atonio 67 and
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,6 8 that dramatically restricted
the scope of Title VII and other employment discrimination
statutes. We have talked about those cases in greater detail in
previous symposia. 69 Congress attempted to legislatively overrule
those decisions and others by proposing the Civil Rights Act. You
probably remember that President Bush vetoed this Act in 1990.70
That version of the bill did provide for its retroactivity. The next
year, through a series of compromises, the bill was passed and
signed into law.7 1 This revision, however, contained no reference
64. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
65. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
66. See Cailin Brown, Women's Work Issues on Agenda at Meeting, TIMES
UNION, April 25, 1991, at C8 (quoting Cathy Collette, director of the women's
rights department for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees that the 1991 Civil Rights Act "is being opposed by business with
the mistaken belief that it will be disruptive"); Al Kamen, Bill Opens Up Second
Frontof Civil Rights Act, TIMES UNION, November 24, 1991, at B6 (stating that
Presidents Bush's signing of the 1991 Civil Rights Act comes after a "bitter,
two-year war over civil rights"); Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Signs Rights Bill
Amid FurorOver Stance, TIMES UNION, November 22, 1991, at A l (explaining
that President Bush hoped "to end a bruising two-year fight over job
discrimination" by signing the 1991 Civil Rights Act).
67. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
68. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
69. See George C. Pratt, Martin A. Schwartz, Leon Friedman, Section 1983,
6 TOURO L. REv. 5 (1989); Charles Stephen Ralston, Paul D. Kamenar, William
Bradford Reynolds, Gail Wright-Sirmans, Employment Discrimination, 6
TOuRO L. REv. 55 (1989).
70. Brown, supra note 66, at C8 (noting that President Bush vetoed the
proposed Civil Rights Act in 1990).
71. See Bush Undermines Compromise With Civil Rights Retreat Playing
Both Sides, He DisgracesHis Own Effort, BUFFALO NEWS, November 23, 1991,
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to the question of retroactivity except with respect to a few
provisions. It seems clear that the failure to include a provision
regarding retroactivity was not an oversight, but rather reflects
Congress' inability to reach a compromise on this issue. Thus, the
question before the Court last Term in Landgraf and Rivers was
what tenet of construction should be used to decide whether or not
the statute is to be applied retroactively, in the absence of any clear
legislative statement. The Court had two seemingly inconsistent
tenets of construction available. One was that a court is to apply
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, 72 but the second
is that retroactivity is not favored in the law and therefore, statutes
will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires that result. 73 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, came down squarely in favor of the presumption against
retroactivity. 74 He concluded that, absent clear congressional intent
to the contrary, a statute should not be given retroactive effect if
the statute works to "impair rights a party possessed when he
at C2 (explaining that while President Bush signed the 1991 Civil Rights Act
with one hand he used his other hand "to snatch away the foundation for two
decades of efforts to get women and minorities into the mainstream job
market"); Kamen, supra note 66, at B6 (stating that President Bush signed the
1991 Civil Rights Act and by doing so began a new dispute over the Act that
will include "armies of regulators and lobbyists, lawyers and bureaucrats");
Stephanie Saul, The Directive in Dispute, NEWSDAY, November 22, 1991, at 5
(stating that civil rights activists claimed President Bush repudiated a critical
section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act as he signed it).
72. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1973) ("We
anchor our holding... on the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice
or statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary."); see also United
States v. Schooner Peggy, I Cranch 103 (1801) ("In such a case the court must
decide according to existing laws, and if necessary to set aside a judgement,
rightful when rendered....").
73. See Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421, 423 (1854) (stating "that they
never should be allowed a retroactive operation where this is not required by
express command or by necessary and unavoidable implication").
74. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994). Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens stated: "The presumption against statutory retroactivity
is founded upon sound considerations of policy and practice, and accords with
long held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of
legislation. We are satisfied it applies to § 102." Id. at 1508.
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acted, increases a party's liability for past conduct, or imposes new
duties with respect to transactions already completed."' 75 If the
statute does any one of those things, absent a clear congressional
intent to have it apply retroactively, it will not be so interpreted or
76
applied.
In applying that standard to the two cases before it, the Court
concluded that the provisions at issue were not to be applied to
pending cases. 7 7 Thus, the holding in Landgrafmeans that the new
compensatory and punitive damage promises of Title VII as well
as the availability of a jury trial do not apply retroactively.
Similarly, in Rivers, the provision extending section 1981 beyond
initial contract formation was not applied to pending cases. 7 8 In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,79 the Court had held that
section 1981 does not apply to anything that happens after
someone is initially hired. 80 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
legislatively overruled Patterson by providing that section 1981 is
not limited to initial contract formation but covers the post-contract
formation employment relation as well. In Rivers, the Court
determined that this provision was not to be applied
retroactively. 8 1 Justice Blackmun was the sole dissenter in these
two cases. His dissent concludes with the observation that there is
"nothing unjust about holding an employer responsible for injuries
'82
caused by conduct that has been illegal for almost thirty years."
These two decisions end three years of intense litigation over the
retroactivity issue involving plaintiffs attempting to benefit from
83
the new remedies available under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.

75. Id. at 1505.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 1508. See Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 151920 (1994).
78. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
79. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
80. Id. at 178-79.
81. See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519-20.
82. Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Rivers, 114 S.
Ct. at 1520-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. See Brown, supra note 66, at C8 (noting that the lobbyists behind the
1991 Civil Rights Act intended to "reverse recent court rulings narrowing the
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IV. MCKENNON V. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING
Co.
I would like to call your attention to the major employment
discrimination case before the Court this Term. I think it is an
interesting one. The case is McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.84 Because the case may be treated as a mixedmotives case, let me provide some background about how the
courts typically resolve employment discrimination claims based
on mixed motives. In a mixed-motive case, there is a legitimate
reason standing alongside an illegitimate or unlawful reason. In
such a case, the plaintiff must establish that the discriminatory
reason was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. 85 The
burden of proof then shifts to the employer to establish that it
would have made the same decision anyway. 86 Some of you may
be familiar with the Mount Healthy standard. 87 In the context of
Title VII, the standard that I just described is derived from a
Supreme Court case entitled Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.88 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 addressed the issue of mixed motive by
explicitly incorporating the motivating factor standard that I just
described. 89 However, the Act alters the remedial scheme quite

remedies available in discrimination cases and putting the burden of proof on

the victim").
84. 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd and remanded, No. 93-1543, 1995
U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23, 1995).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). This section states: "Except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.. even though other factors
motivated the practice." Id.
86. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding
that when a plaintiff establishes that "her gender played a motivating part in an
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account").
87. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
88. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
89. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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substantially. 90 Pursuant to the Act, if a plaintiff demonstrates that
the discriminatory reason was a motivating factor for the adverse
employment decision, liability is established under Title VII, even
if the employer meets the burden of showing that it would have
made the same decision because of some other legitimate reason. 9 1
Liability is established as soon as plaintiff shows that
discrimination was a motivating factor. However, that would just
entitle plaintiff to injunctive and declaratory relief, not to damages,
92
nor to an order directing hiring or promotion or reinstatement.
Those other remedies would only be available if the employer is
unable to meet the burden of demonstrating that it would have
made the same decision anyway. That is the alteration of the
remedial scheme effectuated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
There is a very useful decision authored by Judge Pratt entitled
Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,93 which goes a long way toward
helping to make clear what is otherwise an enormously complex
area of the law, and I heartily commend this decision to you. It is
particularly useful for New York lawyers because it analyzes the
94
issue under the New York Human Rights Law.
This background is relevant to the case before the Court this year
because, in a sense it is a type of mixed-motive case. McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing9 5 raises the issue of the role of afteracquired evidence in employment discrimination cases. The
scenario goes something like this. The employee is discharged. The
employee alleges that the discharge was based upon a
discriminatory reason, such as race or gender. While the case is
pending, typically during discovery, the employer learns of
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964), as amendedby Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L.

No. 102-166, § 5(g)(B)(i) (stating that a court "may grant declaratory relief,
injunctive relief (except as provided by Clause ii) and attorney's fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under
section 2000e-2(m) of this title").
91. Id.
92. Id.

93. 958 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992).
94. Id. at 1180 (explaining that the "action was commenced as a diversity
action under New York's Human Rights Law").
95. 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd and remanded, No. 93-1543, 1995
U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23, 1995).
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479

misconduct that would have warranted the discharge of the
employee had the employer known. What is the relevance of that
after-acquired evidence? Does it serve to bar a plaintiffs claim?
Does it affect plaintiffs damages? Those are the questions that are
posed by McKennon.
Christine McKennon worked for the defendant for thirty-nine
years until she was fired in 1990 when she was sixty-two years
old. 96 She sued the company claiming that her firing was because
of her age. 97 Fourteen months later, while she was testifying at a
deposition, she mentioned that shortly before her discharge, she
had copied confidential documents of the employer because she
suspected that she was about to be fired and she wanted some
"insurance" or "protection."'98 Two days after that deposition, the
employer sent her a letter terminating her employment, or
reterminating her employment, based on the breach of her
employment responsibilities. 99 Apparently, there is no dispute that
had the employer found out about the copying of confidential
papers at the time, she would have been fired. 100 Both the district
court and the Sixth Circuit held that this after-acquired evidence,
coupled with the employer's assertion that it would have fired her
10 1
had it known about this conduct, barred any recovery.
Plaintiffs brief to the Supreme Court argues that after-acquired
evidence should not be used to shield what is otherwise clearly
unlawful discriminatory acts. 102 She further argues that an
employer should have to prove not only that it would have
dismissed the employee had it known, but also that it would have
discovered the information even in the absence of the
discrimination litigation. 103 According to McKennon's brief to the
Supreme Court, if the employer can prove that the misconduct
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 540.
Id.
Id.
Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.at 541,543.

102. Brief for Petitioner at pointheading III, McKennon v. Banner Nashville
Publishing Co., No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23, 1995) (No. 93-

1543).
103. Id.
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would have warranted and resulted in firing and also that the
employer would have discovered the misconduct absent the
litigation, then the evidence can be used to prevent
reinstatement1 04 but it cannot prevent liability.105
This issue has arisen in a number of circuits with most agreeing
with the Sixth Circuit's analysis. 106 Some of the decisions use
107
mixed-motive type analysis concluding that the claim is barred.
Other courts have refused to allow the evidence in to bar the claim
10 8
and instead have said it is relevant just on the issue of damages.
Let me call your attention to two of the leading cases. A case that
is illustrative of those circuits that conclude that after-acquired
evidence should bar the claim is a Tenth Circuit case called
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 109 The
Tenth Circuit bolsters its conclusion by analogizing to a situation
involving a masquerading doctor. 110 If someone who is not really
a doctor, masquerades as a doctor, and then is discharged, would it
make sense to afford this masquerading doctor any remedies? Not
according to the Tenth Circuit. This approach has also been used
by the Eighth, Sixth, and usually the Seventh Circuit.111 The Third
104. Id. at pointheadings III, IV.
105. Id.
106. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc. 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir. 1994)

(stating that the after-acquired evidence of employee misrepresentation bars
recovery for an unlawful discharge, if the employer establishes that they would
not have hired the employee had it known of the misrepresentation); Redd v.
Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 553 (1992), afid, 35 F.3d 561 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief due to defendant's
uncontroverted evidence that had he known of her application falsification and
prior theft conviction, he would have fired her).
107. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
108. Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that employee's resume fraud was relevant only to determine if he was
eligible for back pay); Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 831 F. Supp.
333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that using after-acquired evidence to decide
damages if a violation by the employer is found is the correct approach).

109. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (using Mount Healthy to decide that
after-acquired evidence should bar discriminatory discharge claim).

110. Id. at 708.
111. See Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding that "the Summers rule is the better rule"); Milligan-Jensen v.
Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1992) (agreeing

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/11

16

1995]

Kaufman: Employment Discrimination

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

and the Eleventh Circuits reject that approach. 112 There is a recent
decision from the Third Circuit, Mardell v. Harleysville Life
Insurance Co.,113 that is a very useful decision, because it also
reads like a primer on employment discrimination law. It explains
all the theories and provides all of the citations, in the nature of a
law review article.
One last and I think interesting side note arises in response to
those decisions that have said that after-acquired evidence can be
used to bar the claim. Apparently employers are utilizing new and
very aggressive techniques designed not only to acquire this
evidence during litigation but also to create some opportunities in
advance for creating evidence of misconduct which can be used
after a discharge to bar a discrimination claim. There is literature
now appearing that gives advice to employers, with one article
urging employers to maximize the probability that after-acquired
evidence is available as a defense by revising employment
applications to elicit more specific information. 114 I think we
with the reasoning of the Summers rule and reaffirming the adoption of the
Summers rule); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that "[a]lthough this Court has never squarely adopted the
Summers rationale," two cases decided by the Wgashington court had cited
Summers).
112. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1222 (3d Cir. 1994)

(rejecting the Summers rule); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 1174,
1181 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the Summers rule that "after-acquired evidence
may effectively provide an affirmative defense to Title VII liability").
113. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994).
114. See James A. Burstein & Steven L. Hamann, Better Late Then Never After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 193, 202-03 (1993) ("[A]fter-acquired evidence should be factored in

to ensure that applications and employee manuals
crafting personnel policies ...
expressly state that resume fraud or application misrepresentations will result in
suspension pending discharge" and that "a prompt and thorough investigation of
a complainant's discrimination charge should be conducted."); David D. Kadue
& William J. Dristas, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employee
Misconduct and Resume FraudCases, 44 LAB. L.J. 531 (1993) (discussing how

employers may successfully defend lawsuits for breach of employment contract
and for employment discrimination by utilizing various theories put forth in
decisions relying on after-acquired evidence); George D. Mesritz, "AfterAcquired" Evidence of Pre-Employment Representations:An Effective Defense
Against Wrongful Discharge Claims, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 215, 222 (1992)
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should pay close attention to how the Supreme Court decides the
McKennon case; a) because I think it is a significant issue; and b)
because it might prove instructive on how mixed-motive cases in
general should be handled. 115 Thank you very much for your
attention this late in the day.

("Not every misrepresentation will be caught during pre-employment
background checks, so applications should be revised to maximize the
availability of the 'after-acquired' evidence defense.").
115. Professor Kaufman's speech was given on October 14, 1994. On
January 23, 1995 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded McKennon, No.
93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23, 1995). In a unanimous opinion, the
Court held that after-acquired evidence does not bar the employment
discrimination suit nor preclude all relief. Id. at *2, 3. The Court stated that
"[t]he private litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both
the deterrence and the compensation objectives of the ADEA." Id. The Court
recognized that "if after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have
resulted in termination, operated, in every instance to bar all relief for an earlier
violation of the Act" then the deterrence objective of the ADEA would not be
enforced, as violations would go.unchecked and unenforced. Id at * 13, 14.
The Court, in its analysis, compared after-acquired evidence cases with mixedmotive cases and decided that "mixed motives cases are inapposite here, except
to the important extent they underscore the necessity of determining the
employers motives in ordering the discharge, an essential element in
determining whether the employer violated the federal antidiscrimination law."
Id. at *15. The Court noted that an employer in an after-acquired evidence case
"could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now
claim that the employee was fired for the non discriminatory reason." Id.
In considering what remedies are available to a plaintiff in an after-acquired
evidence case, the Court stated that the question of "[t]he proper boundaries of
remedial relief... must be addressed by the judicial system in the ordinary
course of further decisions, for the factual permutations and the equitable
considerations they raise will vary from case to case." Id. at * 18. However, the
Court did conclude that "as a general rule in cases of this type, neither
reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy." Id. The Court noted that
it would be unfair and pointless to reinstate an employee who would have been,
and will be, terminated upon lawful grounds. Id. at *18, 19.
With respect to backpay, the Court stated that "[t]he beginning point in the
trial court's formulation of a remedy should be calculation of backpay from the
date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered."
Id. at * 19, 20. The Court explained that "extraordinary equitable circumstances
that affect the legitimate interests of either party" should be taken into account
when determining the appropriate relief available. Id. at *20.
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The Court further stated that after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing must be
"of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those
grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge." Id.
Wary of the fact that employers may "as a routine matter undertake extensive
discovery into an employee's background or performance on the job to resist
claims under the Act," the Court stated that employers will be deterred from
such abuses by the ability of the courts to award attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216(b), 626(b) and sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at *20, 21.
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